Shipping Activities: Targets of Maritime Terrorism Risk is intrinsic to maritime activities, not only physical risk
emerging from the hostile marine environment, but also criminal risk. This article is
going to focus on the question of maritime security linked to maritime terrorism. What is maritime terrorism? In its meeting held in February 2002, the Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
examined the contents of the so-called "maritime terrorism". The working group
used a relatively broad definition of maritime terrorism. According to the group, maritime
terrorism refers to the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the marine
environment, (2) using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against
any one of their passengers or personnel, (3) against coastal facilities or settlements,
including tourist resorts, port areas, and port town or cities. Voluntarily vague the definition adopted does not define either terrorist
acts and activities or what is included under marine environment. Criminal acts
and activities undertaken for a political purpose can be qualified of terrorist. Hence,
maritime terrorism is distinct from piracy, which is committed for purely personal gains.
The use of the expression marine environment is wise, since it does not distinguish
between the international law classification of high seas and territorial waters. Maritime terrorism in high seas and in territorial waters Indeed, vessels security is subject to the rules of International Law.
If national navies can protect ships in high seas or in the national territorial seas,
they certainly cannot intervene in case of an attack in foreign territorial seas, 12
nautical miles from State’s baseline. International Law distinction between
territorial seas, international waters and high seas is to be found in the Montego Bay Convention for the Law of the
Sea (1982)
However, criminal attacks against ships tend to happen in territorial waters. In high seas, merchant vessels are less vulnerable because they go fast and are not easily reachable by smaller ships. But attacks usually occur when ships navigate in costal zones or are at anchor. This appears to be the case of both the USS Cole the American destroyer attacked in November 2000 and the Limburg the French supertanker attacked in October 2002 in Yemen territorial waters. In both events it seems that a small boat packed with explosives tore open the hulls of the vessels. A report by Lloyd’s Register shipping service on the Limburg case explained that the location of the hole at the waterline, with its jagged metal edge facing inwards and the absence of any noticeable blast damage to the deck of the vessel support the theory of deliberate attack. Although Governments take considerable actions to prevent terrorism in their territorial waters and are also proactive in the high seas, they are unable to protect national merchant fleet in territorial waters of another sovereign States. In these circumstances the only effective response to global terrorism is inter-governmental cooperation.
Maritime security: a global issue
The need for global cooperation in maritime security naturally falls within the regional and international organisation framework. At the Douala summit (8-12 April 2002), the Agpaoc (Association of the Ports of West and Central Africa) adopted measures to enhance technical and institutional cooperation of member States as well as direct communication of the port authorities. However, the biggest enterprise was probably the one of the International Maritime Organization(2). The IMO was asked to beginning preparatory work to develop a new scheme of comprehensive security measures for international shipping security just after the events of 11th of September 2001. Although IMO has always had interest in security of vessels against criminal attacks – especially piracy – this new demand from the IMO member States was to be a significant step forward in maritime security. The aim was to develop a new International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities.
New ship and port security measures
On 9 - 13 December 2002, a widely attended IMO diplomatic Conference(3) adopted new range of measures to enhance maritime security. The Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS) adopted a number of amendments to the Convention. The new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)(4) was attached as an annexe to the SOLAS Convention.
The Code contains detailed security-related requirements for Governments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second, recommendatory section (Part B). It was thought that ensuring the security of ships and port facilities is basically a risk management activity. The Code takes the approach that appropriate security measures should be the result of accurate evaluation of the risks in each particular case. The purpose of the Code is to provide a standardized, consistent framework for assessing risk. Governments should communicate the threat at a port authority or for a ship using appropriate security level. A limited number of security levels are defined in the Code. Security levels 1, 2 and 3 correspond to normal, medium and high threat situation, respectively. Subject to a system of governmental control, all ships over 500 GT, all passengers vessels and mobile offshore oil and gas rigs should meet the Code requirements by July 2004. They are obliged to carry Ship Security Plans, International Ship Security Certificate and have a Ship Security Officer, as well as certain equipment onboard. Shipping companies are obliged to appoint Company Security Officers. Similarly, Governments are required to write comprehensive Security Plans for international ports. Locally, port facilities must adopt Security Plans, appoint Security Officers and acquire certain security equipment. Additionally, port authorities must monitor and control access to the port facilities, activities of people and cargo. They must also ensure the optimum availability of security communications. Ports that handle international traffic should meet these new requirements by 2005.
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